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Session 4B
MARSHALL LEAFFER: So many thanks to Hugh and his assistants for
putting on this incredible event. Our topic today, as you all know, is the
functionality doctrine. We have two main speakers. Mark Lemley, who among
other things, is a professor at Stanford, and Gordon Humphreys of the European
Intellectual Property Office. We also have a fantastic group of discussions. David
Stone of Allen and Overy, London, Irene Calboli of Texas A&M School of Law,
and Jeff Handelman of Crowell and Moring, Chicago.
For what it's worth, I personally consider the functionality doctrine is the
most troublesome in all of trademark law. The case law is incoherent,
inconsistent, and at best confusing. I can't think of any two better people than
Mark Lemley and Gordon Humphrey to explain and clarify functionality for us.
Mark Lemley will discuss the issue from a US perspective, and Gordon
Humphrey will do so from the European point of view. Mark, why don't you start
us off?
MARK A. LEMLEY: Okay, great. Thanks, Marshall. As Marshall
indicated, the panel is titled, Functionality Doctrine and Disarray, Marshall thinks
it's very confusing. I'm here to explain to you that it's not actually confusing at all.
There are a few circuits that have decided for whatever reason not to follow the
law, but the law as it presently stands is actually pretty clear in the United States.
I'm going to share some slides.
MARK A. LEMLEY: The traditional functionality discussion is best
captured pre-Supreme Court intervention by the Morton-Norwich case.
Morton-Norwich says, well, we consider a variety of factors in trying to decide
whether this functionality, did you actually get a utility patent on these things, did
you claim that it was functionally better? Is it easier to manufacture, cheaper and
so forth?
Factor number three, I think, before the TrafFix case, this availability of
alternative designs was central to a number of courts. Here is the predecessor to
the Federal Circuit. They use this doctrine to say that the fantastic spray bottle
depicted here, the spray nozzle is not functional because there are other ways to
do a spray nozzle even though there are some clear advantages both in
manufacturing and use of this nozzle over others. That rule starts to change with
the US Supreme Court decision in TrafFix versus Marketing Displays, TrafFix
involves springs designed to keep road signs from blowing over in the wind.
The idea here is that they have a utility patent, the utility patent expires,
the competitor comes to use a similar spring design and TrafFix sues and says,
“No, people recognize this dual spring design as ours.” Supreme Court says,
“that's not permissible, that's functional.” It says, “we don't have to decide
whether an expired utility patent itself is going to make something functional,
because in this case, there's no question that the springs work better than
alternative designs.” The court considers and rejects the idea that we heard from
Morton-Norwich that well, there are other designs you could use. You could space
the springs apart, you could have three springs or four springs. The court says that
doesn't matter, all we care about is that this spring design actually affects the cost
or quality of the article.
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What the court does, then is to set out what has become the general test for
functionality. In general terms, a product feature is functional and cannot serve as
a trademark, if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article, or if it affects the
cost or quality of the article. Then it goes on to talk about a functional feature
being one the exclusive use of which would put competitors at a significant
non-reputation related disadvantage. Now, note a couple of things about this test.
You can read this and you can say, well, we got three different possible tests here.
We've got essential to use, we've got affects the cost or quality, we've got
significant non-reputation related disadvantage.
Affects the cost or quality, I think is for all intents and purposes the key
test for utilitarian functionality. Anything that is essential to the use or purpose of
the article, almost by definition is going to affect the cost or quality of that article.
Because you couldn't make the article, it obviously affects the cost or quality. The
cost or quality of the article test swallows, in almost all cases, the essential to the
use or purpose test, and has become in virtually all circuits the de facto, the
dominant test for utilitarian functionality. Courts do use this language about
significant non-reputation-related disadvantage, though, not just to demonstrate
the purpose of the test but also as a test for aesthetic functionality as we'll see in a
moment.
One place where you might actually use the essential piece would be to
say, a circumstance like the one in Eppendorf, in which the piece, the element of
the device is essential to this particular device, even though there's no reason to
think this particular device is any better than any other device. Here the Fifth
Circuit says if the fins on the syringe are necessary to the operation of this product
that meets the essentiality test, even though other competitors don't need this fin
design.
Similarly, in the wake of, TrafFix's, the Seventh Circuit in the specialized
seating case says, there are lots of different designs for a frame chair backs, here
are a number of them. Each of these designs have cost-benefit trade-offs, they're
better at some things than others, they're stronger, they're cheaper to manufacture,
they're lighter, they interlock better. Each of those choices is itself a functional
choice because it affects the cost or quality of the article. The fact that there were
multiple present alternative designs, the old CCPA test in Morton-Norwich would
have said no functionality.
In the wake of TrafFix, virtually every circuit has said no, there is actually
functionality in that circumstance, regardless of the presence of the alternative
designs. That brings us to the recent case in the Third Circuit from Pocky. In the
Glico case, the Pocky biscuit is a chocolate-covered long biscuit, you hold on to
the non-chocolate-covered portion, which is a cookie there at the top, and you can
eat the chocolate-covered cookie portion.
The Third Circuit says this biscuit design is functional. It goes through
several ways you might consider functionality. Evidence that shows that it makes
it work better. The fact that you're advertising its usefulness, utility patents, we've
talked about those. The key here is at the end in the fourth point, if there are only
a few ways to design a product, that's evidence that the product is functional, the
court says but the converse is not true.
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The existence of other workable designs is not enough to make a design
non-functional. The court here says the Pocky cookie is functional, not because
there aren't other ways to design cookies, there are plenty of other ways to design
a chocolate-covered cookie. Because the particular choices you've made affect the
quality of the article, they affect the usability of the article, the ease of holding on
to it, whether it will melt on your fingers, and so forth, and that's sufficient to say
you don't get to control this shape under trademark law.
One thing to note finally is I think in the wake of TrafFix, we actually have
a convergence across pretty much all of the circuits on this new test, and in
particular on the rejection of the availability of alternative design requirements
from Morton-Norwich. The one exception to that is the Federal Circuit which has
continued notwithstanding TrafFix to hold on to this idea that if there are
available alternative design something is non-functional as a utilitarian matter.
Finally, let me say just a bit about aesthetic functionality. This is the
canonical example of the Heart-Shaped Box of Chocolates. It's not any better at
holding chocolates but it's not something that people are buying because they
think it signals brand they're buying it because they want a heart-shaped box of
chocolates.
Similarly, my favorite trademark registration of all time, I think, the circle.
This is a registered trademark for a beach towel. The plaintiff produces a round a
beach towel, there's no reason to think round beach towels are better beach
towels. That they're better at holding people are easier to fold, probably the
opposite. Nonetheless, the court says people aren't buying round two beach towels
because they signal that they come from CLM design incorporated, they're buying
round beach towels because they look round, and people want round.
Here, too we've got convergence, I think, on the test for the most part, the
test for aesthetic functionality is a much narrower one. Here we do actually
require effective competition and we do look at comparable alternatives. In the
Maker's Mark case, the Sixth Circuit says, look, the fact that there are lots of
different ways to seal a bottle doesn't mean you can't have a trademark on the red
wax dripping seal where the red wax dripping seal is attractive. Here too, again,
we've got convergence in the circuit's one circuit exception.
Again, the Fifth Circuit has, notwithstanding repeated suggestions from
the Supreme Court refused to acknowledge that the aesthetic functionality
doctrine exists at all, but pretty much every other circuit I think is coming in line.
The Sixth Circuit says, “We don't have to decide this but the test they adopt is the
one everyone is adopting.” I will stop there.
MARSHALL LEAFFER: Thank you, Mark, for that nice overview. I think
I'll open this up to our panelists. David, Irene, Jeff, and Gordon--What do you all
think?
JEFFERY A. HANDELMAN: I've got a question for Mark. Mark, one
question with respect to functionality. In your experience, is it effective to exclude
functional features from the intellectual property that you're claiming in an effort
to avoid a finding of functionality? In the registration context, for example, in the
United States, we can exclude a functional feature by using dotted lines in the
trademark drawing and an infringement action likewise, we could tell the court,
4
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we're limiting our claim to a certain ornamental or arbitrary feature rather than
claiming the overall design. Is that an effective approach?
MARK A. LEMLEY: I think it can be. I think it depends a little bit on the
circumstances. Let me separate litigation and registration because I think the
issues present a little bit differently. I think in litigation, it's perfectly reasonable
and indeed desirable to say-- Assuming you're not only trying to sue someone
who's copied the functional features as in TrafFix. Look, we're not trying to claim
the functional features. Imagine, for instance, I've got the shape of a Ferrari.
There's no question that there are a bunch of elements about the shape of a Ferrari
that make it go faster, make it corner better, et cetera. I'm not entitled to lay claim
to those things.
I think I don't have to lay claim to those things as if someone copied the
actual overall design of the Ferrari. A long as I can show that they've copied
things that are not functional, along with the things that are functional, I think
that's sufficient for litigation. We'd also like it to be sufficient for registration.
There, I think things get a little more questionable, so you're right that we can use
dotted lines to say we're excluding or this is not a claimed feature of the product.
One more complicated situation is where I think it actually is a claim of
the overall trademark that it is the entire design that I am claiming, and I
understand that some of the features in that design are functional and I don't lay
claim to those things standing alone but I want to lay claim to the entirety of the
shape of the Ferrari, let's say. I'm not sure dotted line claiming is going to work
necessarily there. A, because it may be hard to take out exactly or identify the
things that are making the car go faster. B, because my understanding of dotted
line claiming is that if I use a dotted line, I'm actually saying you could vary
something here and I don't care what goes there. That might or might not be true,
but the instinct is right, which is, I think you can get around a functionality
limitation by affirmatively disclaiming to the office, "Look, I'm not claiming
ownership over that particular functional element."
JEFFERY A. HANDELMAN: Thank you, very helpful.
MARSHALL LEAFFER: Irene you had something in mind.
IRENE CALBOLI: Mark, thank you very much for, as always, a fantastic
presentation. I agree with you about the fact that in the utilitarian functionality, we
see a convergence, but I would challenge that in the aesthetic functionality. In the
aesthetic functionality, in particular, now, we are seeing a lot of expired design,
color claiming and we are seeing-- I would say there have been more guidelines
so that I'm looking at that from a non-traditional trademark standpoint, as you
might imagine. I would say that there is really no a convergence or some specific
guidelines that applicants or the TTB, the TAB, and later the courts are following.
It's a bit of a "we know when we see it" approach. I mean, would you say
that aesthetic functionality also is a small converging or it's the most difficult to
assess? At the same time, it seems to me that is becoming the elephant in the
room very much on a lot of perpetual rights.
MARK A. LEMLEY: I think I agree with that. I would say two things are
going on here, one is as Irene indicates, lots of people are making efforts to lay
claim to things in expired design patents and so forth. I think many of those will
5
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turn out to be aesthetically functional. People are the fact that the doctrine is
becoming clear, it doesn't mean people aren't trying to sort of change or push
against the doctrine. The second thing, though, that might be a more significant
reason for Irene's reaction is, I think the legal rules are converging.
We've got agreement that there is an aesthetic functionality doctrine, we've
got agreement on what the test is, but that test is a lot more amorphous and less
clear than it is in utilitarian functionality. The fact that we're asking, does this put
competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage? Is there sort of
not a competitive necessity, but a kind of competitive usefulness to having access
to this?
Those tests as the Sixth Circuit phrases them, I think the courts are
agreeing that that's the test, but that it's kind of like the obviousness doctrine in
patent law, it does have a more you know it when you see it feature. That leaves a
lot of room for more disagreement about particular applications of that test.
IRENE CALBOLI: Thank you.
MARSHALL LEAFFER: I see, perhaps we've exhausted our five minutes
of discussion. Irene does that seem to be the case?
IRENE CALBOLI: Yes, that's correct.
MARSHALL LEAFFER: Let's go on to Gordon Humphreys and who will
present the European point of view on this issue.
GORDON HUMPHREYS: The most common form of prohibited
functionality in the EU is obviously technical function like in the States. While
trademarks that are composed exclusively of the shape, or other characteristics of
goods that are needed or necessary to obtain a technical result have no place on
the register, designs are prohibited if their features are solely dictated by technical
function. That difference in wording between the two types of IPR was noted by
the advocate general in Philips v Remington (C-299/99), now quite an old case
and was said to be “not a capricious difference”.
Put simply, the bar is higher for designs to be found functional than it is
for trademarks. It's going to be harder to show that a design is solely technical.
Now, why is this? Well, the main problem is that with IP, as far as market
competition is concerned, the right holder has obviously a monopoly. In Lego
Juris A/S v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and
Designs) (OHIM) Case C-48/09 P, the Court of Justice noted that if a monopoly
is given to the shape that embodies a technical solution, it would unduly impair
the ability of competitors to market shapes incorporating the same technical
solutions. In reality, what's often lurking in background in these cases is a patent
that has either expired or is about to do so.
A strict approach to registering shape marks is necessary to avoid the
20-year monopoly over a technical solution granted to a patent being extended
potentially in perpetuity. Now, obviously, the damage done in similar
circumstances by a design which has a maximum lifespan of 25 years in the EU is
less. EU case law has come to regard patents, at least in trademark cases, as strong
prima facie evidence of functionality rather like in the cases we've just heard
about in the US. Now, in this Lego case (C-48/09 cited above), the Court of
Justice basically laid down a two-step test, which was, firstly, to identify all the
6
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essential characteristics of the shape and then to consider, at the second stage,
whether all of those characteristics perform a technical function.
The shape doesn't have to be the only one that could obtain the technical
result, so it's quite different to the situation in the US. EU is not so impressed by
the multiplicity of forms theory. Nevertheless, EU trademark law doesn't make it
too easy for registrants to try and circumvent functionality prohibitions by simply
adding some random decorative element to the shape. Instead, the decorative
element has to be important or play a distinctive role, and this requirement is
pretty strict. In the Lego case, the red color of the Lego brick didn't distract from
the technical function of the studs and the brick shape.
As case law has progressed so too has the severity of the functionality test.
Technical function has increasingly been inferred rather than being readily
apparent from graphic representation. Traditionally, in EU trademark law where
there's a dispute on the registrability of a sign, we look at what it is on on the
register and how the sign is represented there. Increasingly, a certain largess has
crept in and in Simba Toys GmbH & Co. KG v EUIPO, Case C-30/15 P, (the
Rubrics Cube case), the Court of Justice considered that there was a technical
function here consisting in the twisting or rotating mechanism that was internal in
the cube, but which was - according to the Court - apparent from the grid lines
running up and down the cube. I would submit that such inference seems rooted
in actual knowledge of how the cube functions, how it's used, and is not apparent
just from the representation on the trade mark register.
Inference from graphical representation has sometimes required a certain
amount of gymnastics and in the Yoshida metal Industry Co. Ltd v EUIPO, Case
C‑421/15 P, (the Yoshida knife case) that you can see in the middle here, the
original filing was in fact for a 2D trademark consisting of a pattern of dots. It
was subsequently requalified by the EUIPO as a 3D handle of a knife with dents
that were necessary to obtain a non-skid effect and as a result, was found to be
technically functional. This decision was approved by both the General Court and
the Court of Justice.
However, it may have been more appropriate to admit that use actually
plays a role in assessing technical function. That seems to be increasingly the
case. In the very recent judgment The Yokohama Rubber Co. Ltd and European
Union Intellectual Property Office v Pirelli Tyre SpA, Joined Cases C-818/18 P
and C-6/19 P, (the Pirelli Tire case), the Court held that for the purposes of
identifying the essential characteristics of the sign, material can be considered
that makes it possible to look at what the mark actually represents. For that
reason, the representation of product use will be relevant.
However, in this case, the Court said that it wasn't sufficiently apparent
from the representation of the sign that the shape was actually a single tread of a
groove. More particularly, it wasn't apparent that it was a single tread pattern
groove performing an exclusively technical function (i.e. expelling water and
gripping the road surface).
The Court considered that the sign didn't exclusively represent the shape
of the goods in question, or a shape, which on its own represents quantitatively
and qualitatively a significant part of the goods, in this case, the tires. In fact,
7
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looking at the way that shape marks are actually used is becoming increasingly
relevant. In the Gömböc judgment, Case C‑237/19, the shape at issue was a
three-dimensional object that, due to its external design, always returns to a
balanced upright position. You would probably only know that if you’d seen it
being used. Nevertheless, the shape of that object was held by the Court to serve
in its entirety to achieve a technical objective of always being able to stand
upright.
Even the humble Kit Kat four-fingered chocolate bar (Joined Cases
C-84/17 P, C-85/17 P, and C-95/17 P) can actually result from purely technical
functions such as its three grooves for breaking the chocolate and the angle of
those grooves due to the manufacturing process.
The Court said that to check whether the essential features of a shape are
functional, decision takers need to look at objective and reliable information. In
other words, things that are external to the representation on the register. Unlike
for other absolute grounds, the perception of the target public is not the litmus test
of functionality. It may have some persuasive value but it's never decisive.
Turning now to designs. For designs, in the wake of DOCERAM GmbH v
CeramTec GmbH, C-395/16, (the DOCERAM case), the crux of the functionality
test is the so-called, no aesthetic consideration test. That is that only technical
considerations dictate the design of the product. The aim here is to prevent
technological innovation from being hampered by granting design protection to
features dictated solely by the technical function of a product.
The problem that we are getting is what kind of evidence do you need to
prove that there were some aesthetic considerations. Do you need expert
witnesses, for example? The Advocate General in DOCERAM (C-395/16) said
that it may be necessary for courts to seek clarification from independently
court-appointed experts because national courts don't sometimes possess the
highly technical competences necessary to determine these issues.
I have to say, this is something that is a difficulty at the EUIPO and at the
Boards of Appeal. Like for trademarks, assessments are made on objective
relevant circumstances, including objective reasons for selecting the designs, its
use, and the existence. The existence of alternative designs can be relevant but
they're not determinative, and they're compromised for the law that prevailed in
some member states beforehand, particularly Germany.
Establishing what are aesthetic considerations is not easy and sits with
difficulty with the notion of an industrial design, which by the very way it's
phrased is not a particularly aesthetic thing. I would just quickly say that the
situation in designs seems to have got more generous because of the General
Court’s judgment in Case T-515/19 Lego A/S v EUIPO and Delta Sport
Handelskontor GmbH, decided last year. The Court annulled the Board of
Appeal’s decision for failing to consider possible creative aspects of the design,
namely, the smooth surface of either side of the row of four studs on the upper
side of the Lego brick. This was quite a generous approach to what could
conceivably be an aesthetic feature.

8

Session 4B
Then just very quickly to say that like in the States, we have aesthetic
functionality, it's also extremely difficult to establish. It was established in the
judgment in Bang & Olufsen Speaker, Case T-508/08.
It was also referred to in the Hauck Trip Trap Case C-205/13, where they
said that beauty, safety, comfort, quality and iconic style can confer substantial
value. It wasn't successful in the Louboutin red sole shoe case (C163/16) because
the Court said it wasn't dealing with a shape. In the Eames chair Board of Appeal
case, it would've been a very interesting case. Unfortunately, it settled, but one of
the arguments that was brought forward was that it wasn't just all about aesthetics.
It was actually about some snob value in owning one of these chairs because the
likes of Andy Warhol, David Bowie, and Madonna had also had these chairs. The
jury is still out on how we're really going to handle aesthetic functionality, but as I
say, it's a difficult one, and with that, thanks.
MARSHALL LEAFFER: Well, thank you so much, Gordon. I don't want
to put you guys on the spot, but it would be interesting if you could to reflect on
the similarities and differences between the US view and the European view on
the issue of functionality. Before so, is there anything from the panel that you
would like to discuss here?
DAVID STONE: Marshall, if I can just jump in and put a question to
Gordon, that perhaps isn't a fair one. Do you think registries have got too strict on
findings of functionality in trademarks? I'll perhaps set out where I'm coming
from. This is an exception to the rule that signs should be registrable, and as an
exception it should be narrowly construed. We're not seeing vast numbers of
businesses successfully enforcing patent-like monopolies through trademarks.
We're not in fact seeing many cases in courts at all that raise these issues. They're
mostly registry decisions where the law is being settled. Against that background,
do you think a test closer to the design test might be better for trademarks?
GORDON HUMPHREYS: Well, it's an interesting question. First of all, I
would say that it's true that it is an uphill struggle to get these kinds of shape
marks onto the register in terms of functionality. There was a modicum of success
last year with the Guerlain red lipstick holder case, Case T-488/20, but then that
was succeeded by the moon boot case, T-483/20, which seemed to dash those
hopes very quickly. I think that there is a lot of reticence from the General Court
and we've now actually got over 20 years of history behind this, starting with, I
think, the Maglite torch (flashlight) case, T-88/00, that goes back to the beginning
of the century. It's going to be very difficult to change it.
As I demonstrated at the beginning, in the Philips v. Remington case, the
Advocate General started out by saying that the wording of the provisions is
different and that he made a big deal out of that which I think has been followed
by the Court. While I can appreciate from the point of view of trademark owners,
it would be very nice to have an easier ride with getting these registrations. I think
it's unlikely to happen. I think we're just too far down this road to go back now,
and I think that really designs are an alternative. Theoretically, somebody could
start off with filing a design and try and use it as a trademark and build up
secondary meaning with it. Potentially difficult, but theoretically possible.
9
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MARK A. LEMLEY: Could I ask about the interaction between some of
the technical and aesthetic functionality doctrines in particular in the Lego case?
Because one of the things that struck me as quite interesting about that is, it was
entirely plausible to say some elements of the Lego brick design are not dictated
by function in the technical sense but those elements I think are desirable
aesthetically, and they are also well known as Legos. I wonder what the court
does. This is something the US courts have struggled with. How do we deal with
something that is both desirable because of how it looks and has become known
as a brand over time?
GORDON HUMPHREYS: I should have pointed out that, of course, when
I used the word design, it's patent design. It's a design patent in US terminology,
so it's not a trademark. At the EUIPO we're dealing with both rights. This is not
aesthetic functionality in the trademark sense. It's the functionality test drawn up
for designs. The last slide that I showed was about the aesthetic functionality test
with the Eames chair and everything, but it's true that there's a huge overlap
between as David was just saying. There's a huge overlap between these shape
marks that we have and what we call the designs in Europe. You can actually have
dual protection and the idea of the aesthetic functionality is to limit that dual
protection.
I have to admit that on the trademark side, it's rarely you used because it's
actually very, like you were saying, Mark for the US, it's actually so difficult to
apply. It can be used and it sometimes is, but it's a bit because you feel it's too
much of it's too aesthetic to be a trademark, but it is a bit of a nebulous test and
therefore it's more difficult. On the side of the Lego brick, to go back to your
thing, the issue there was, was it functional in a technical sense? Like the grips
and everything like that, or was it just purely functional or was there any aesthetic
element that could save it from being technically functional? There, it looks like
the court may be willing to be more generous for the EU designs. That may be the
route to take is if you can't get a trademark, go for design.
JEFFERY A. HANDELMAN: Go ahead.
MARK A. LEMLEY: I was going to say the other issue that the Lego
raises, which I think is a fascinating one for trademark to think about is the sort of
role of interoperability and functionality. One of the things Lego wants, I think is
not just to control the actual design of its bricks, but to make sure that other
people's bricks, even if they don't look the same, can't interconnect easily with it,
and so it might be that the courts could distinguish between the design elements
that don't relate to the kind of ability to interlock and the design elements, even if
they are aesthetic that do affect the ability to interlock.
GORDON HUMPHREYS: I mean the interconnection issue is an issue in
the design case. That's a different kettle of fish, but it's there in the background.
You are absolutely right.
MARSHALL LEAFFER: Irene, do you have a comment? Before we get
to Irene, I just want to say that we have a very distinguished group of people in
the audience here and I was hoping that they would come up with some questions
or comments themselves. I'd like to invite them as well to participate.
10
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IRENE CALBOLI: Again, thank you Gordon very much for guiding us
through several of the old and newer cases in the EUIPO. I agree that it's
becoming more difficult to register this, Mark, but different than David. I'm
actually happy about it because I and Mark and others have actually had meetings
with the examiners and with the EUIPO, the Swiss EUIPO office, and several
other EUIPO offices, specifically to look at guidelines to restrict the registration
of these signs because of the overlap.
I think the way you frame it, with the overlap with industrial design. here,
I want to ask your question, when you look at the Lego, and not at the Lego case
but also the Lego bricks, you look at Legos and you have the shapes, but then you
have every single little round of Lego as the word Lego, so the logo of Lego
imprinted in. I've been doing a lot of work on industrial design, furniture design
lately. Whether it's the Barcelona chair, the canal, and so on.
Now, the shapes, some of them have been registered. Many of them are
even if they're registered, they can easily be challenged, but so now they relying
on, really, the serial number and the signature or the actual trademark engraved in
the-- so the authenticity is given by the mark, which it's the way should be.
During the life of the design, you have a monopoly and then, of course, that
feature becomes distinctive because you had a monopoly, and then when the
monopoly expires, that's the quid pro quo, regardless of whether it is distinctive or
not, you have to let it go because that was the quid pro quo with design, and then
you have to rely on the trademarks on the branding, so, say, well Bialetti coffee
makers are only made by Bialetti but the actual functionality of the thing can be
copied by somebody else. That's, to me, is a great example. No one coffee makers
make as good coffee makers as Bialetti does in reality.
The question is when you see this suit, just this cumulative use of the logo,
and, at the same time, the attempt to register the shape, both are trademark, don't
you think that that is theoretically a contradiction because now the generic version
cannot use the name Lego, and so it's going to be different enough. The fact that I
use my name on my products in many way is the only way I can guarantee
authenticity but is all the way to basically acknowledge that the other is a design,
and, here, I have my mark, so other cannot copy that. What do you think about
that?
GORDON HUMPHREYS: Well, what I think is that putting the brand
name on the product and then registering the whole as a 3D mark. Including the
brand name embossed on the product is a sort of backdoor entry to getting these
types of mark on the register. It is one way you can do it. There are some caveats
to that. I mean, obviously, if the brand name is so small that it's virtually
imperceptible, that might not work, but it is a way that people use to get these
shapes onto the register. Whether that is too sneaky to be and shouldn't really be
allowed is another question, but it's done. I mean, then the issue becomes what
scope of protection does that mark have in an infringement situation?
MARK A. LEMLEY: Just one great example, now a fairly old one from
the United States in this regard, in the Sega versus Accolade case, where Sega
tried to prevent game players from writing games compatible with their video
game platform. One of the things they did was they made a lockout code that you
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had to enter, and if you entered that lockout code, it made the letters "SEGA"
appear on the screen, and then when Accolade used the lockout code and the
letters "SEGA" appeared, it filed suits for trademark infringement saying, "Hey,
you've made the word 'SEGA' appear."
The ninth circuit actually turned it around on them and said, "No, if
anything, this is Sega's active infringement, not Accolade's because it's Sega that
is forcing this company, if it wants compatibility, to falsely represent that there's a
connection between Sega and Accolade. Your mileage may vary, but it's not
always going to work out to the benefit of the trademark owner to try to force that
brand name use as part of the interconnection.
GORDON HUMPHREYS: I mean, conversely, if the shape is something
that's not really particularly distinctive, it may be that there's no real scope of
protection of that mark beyond the actual verbal element of it. To answer Denis’
question, I mean, whether it should be more properly a clear distinction between
designs and trademarks. I think the reality is that there is a huge overlap, and I
think that the decision-taking authorities are not rigorously pursuing the aesthetic
functionality objection. We could go a lot further with that, but at the end of the
day, this is a policy decision. I'm not saying it's a policy of the EUIPO or anybody
else, but I mean policy decision in a political sense as to how objectionable you
regard the cumulative effect of designs and trademarks to be. Certainly,
trademarks and patents are highly objectionable, but trademarks and design seem
to be somewhat less objectionable to accumulate.
MARSHALL LEAFFER: Any other comments from our panel? Again, I
urge our very distinguished audience to ask us questions here. I see some of these
names here that I'd like to hear from. You're on mute, Jeff.
JEFFERY A. HANDELMAN: Marshall. Quick point on-- related to what
Gordon was just mentioning, and Mark and Irene. In the embossing world, if you
take a look at bath tissue and paper towels, more and more companies are trying
to protect the embossing pattern that appears on the bath tissue or on the paper
towel, and there's an example where increasingly companies are using not only
designs, but also-- For example, Georgia Pacific will emboss GP integrated into
the quilted Northern design, so if somebody copies the design, if they copy the GP
elements, those are strong identifiers of the source of the tissue, so it's a way to
deter copying. As long as the design is not functional, if it becomes distinctive, it
can be registered as a trademark and then protected against other paper
manufacturers.
GORDON HUMPHREYS: Yes. I mean, we are getting-- we've had cases
simply involving embossed toilet paper and things like that, [chuckles] with logos
and patterns, and which people try to protect as trademarks in my view, my
personal view, is that those are not really source identifiers, but if you start adding
on verbal elements onto them, then that may be a sufficiently distinctive element
in order to actually identify commercial origin, so they may be able to act as
trademarks, and they're no longer purely aesthetic because there's a verbal
element in them. I think that is a possibility.
MARK A. LEMLEY: Of course, this is the strategy that the luxury goods
market has long used to try to effectively get design protection when copyright
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wasn't available. Reprint the Louis Vuitton logo all over your purse. Reprint the
Chanel logo all over your purse. It doesn't matter whether the purse design is
protectable. If you have to copy the logo repeatedly in order to copy the thing,
then you're going to be running afoul of a more standard trademark protection.
MARSHALL LEAFFER: Any other comments? Again, question and
answer is quite open, and I urge you all to do so. In the interim, I do want to make
a plug for In re Morton-Norwich. I've always been a fan of that case. I believe that
competitive alternatives should be one of the criteria, and an important one. The
problem with that is how many? Is there a universe of effective substantial
alternatives? That's been the problem. How large does that universe have to be?
On the other hand, I like Morton-Norwich for one reason. It has a clarity in terms
of the litigation process.
To me, nebulous language of the Kravis case is not enough. You have to
have specific elements in which you can hang on to and make sense in a litigation
situation like that, particularly with the jury. That's my plug for Morton-Norwich.
Another question is why are the Morton Norwich used in the context of design
patent but since Traffix are not used in trademark law. I'm just wondering if you
could make a distinction, whether you find it more appropriate for the
Morton-Norwich elements to be used in design patent rather than in a trademark,
or, perhaps, you see no difference at all?
MARK A. LEMLEY: I am troubled by the fact-- You're absolutely right
that, in part, because we use Morton-Norwich in designing the patent, the
functionality doctrine of design patents in the United States is much narrower than
the trademark functionality doctrine. I find that troubling. A particularly
remarkable example of that to me is the Apple versus Samsung case, where the
federal circuit held that the very same rounded corner of your cell phone was
functional for trademark purposes and not functional for design patents purposes.
That strikes me as an indication that maybe we're thinking about one of these
things wrong because when the very same design elements can be protected under
two different doctrines and we say it's functional for one and not functional for the
other, that's worrisome.
To me, I think the problem is that we have narrowed the design patent
functionality doctrines almost to the point of non-existence, and we've done it, in
part, by using Morton-Norwich and Irene's reference earlier. The other question is
how many different design elements will there be? Once we go down that route,
we end up making it a competitive necessity test. If this is not the only possible
way to design a product, then I get to own this shape even though it turns out to
effect the cost or quality of the article.
For me, I think the traffic's test is actually quite more-- a bit more specific
and applicable because we can easily determine, "Does this product element affect
the cost or quality of the article?" That is a factual question on which we can take
evidence, whereas, the sort of, "How many alternatives is too many?", I find to be
a somewhat amorphous question.
MARSHALL LEAFFER: Not to be argumentative here, Mark, but on the
effect of cost and quality of an article, every product feature affects the cost and
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quality of an article. How do you specify the kind of costs, the kind of quality that
we're looking at in order to determine functionality?
MARK A. LEMLEY: I do think it is a significant test but-- It's a
significant, more restrictive test, in part, for that reason, but I'm not sure I've
signed onto the idea that everything affects the cost or quality of the article, the
choice of color scheme, or the kinds of things that we had in mind as possibly
serving as sort of aesthetic or three-dimensional trademarks, I think, are generally
not things that affect the shape and operation of the product and probably
shouldn't affect the cost of the article.
I guess if it turns out that red paint is more expensive than blue paint, that's
probably not something that we would want to consider in going into the
functionality determination. Making it cheaper to manufacture, and, therefore,
giving you a cost advantage over competitors does seem, to me, precisely the kind
of thing we would include.
MARSHALL LEAFFER: Absolutely. I couldn't agree with you more on
that. I just think it needs to be specified with a little bit more detail.
DAVID STONE: Marshall, may I please pick up on Mark's comment on
Apple-Samsung because I think it's a demonstration of the difference, and it was
dealt with by various courts in Europe at the time. A rounded corner on a
smartphone is cheaper to make than a sharp corner. It's less likely to break if it
drops. It’s less likely to catch on clothes. Those are all technical functions. But in
rounding a corner, there is an aesthetic choice between a sharp rounding or a very
gentle rounding that goes over a bigger curve.
The fact of “roundedness”, if I can call it that, is a technical function, but
the way in which the rounding is done is an aesthetic choice. Adopting the
language from the EU statutes, as Gordon pointed out earlier, "Is the
“roundedness” necessary to obtain a technical result?" "Yes, it is. Therefore, no
trademark." "Is this “roundedness” solely dictated by technical function?" "No,
it's not." There's an aesthetic choice into how the rounding has been done, so that
feature is not solely dictated by technical function. Therefore it's entitled to what
you would call design patent protection, what we would call registered design
protection. I think, Mark, it's actually a really good example - at least under EU
law - of how an object can fall one side for trademarks, the other side for designs.
That, in essence, highlights the difference between the two tests.
MARSHALL LEAFFER: Gordon, do you agree with that?
GORDON HUMPHREYS: Yes. I was just wondering, Mark, do you think
that the more liberal approach of design patents is due to what I was saying in my
presentation about the lesser damage that's done by having a design patent
protection for a more limited period of time, as compared with the damage that
can be done for a trademark protection that is unlimited, potentially? Do you think
that's the policy behind this, or is that just a--?
MARK A. LEMLEY: I'm not sure we made up-- I think there's a policy
argument for it. I'm not sure that's actually the policy explanation for why we
went there. I think this is an historical accident, and Peter Menell has a nice
historical paper on the development of us law in this regard. Irene wants to jump
in here.
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IRENE CALBOLI: You know what I think is the story here? Why do we
ended up with these three-dimensional marks, despite, early on, the UK courts
said the bottle of Coca-Cola should never be. The US never wanted to have this
sui generis right for design. The US is allergic to generic. We had an industrial
design protection on a time for-- Europe, before, was ornamental models, Italy
and so on, and that system has really been what created industrial design
protection in Europe, and that's been exported to a lot of jurisdiction.
America had the design patent, but design patent are much more expensive
to get. They require an actual examination, and so you are not using it as easily.
Because America didn't have an industrial design, we ended up with that trade
dress. Now trade dress is, of course, trademarks on steroids in many ways because
it's trademarks for shapes. Not just shapes, but the cores, restaurants, and so on,
based on the Supreme court cases.
Now, the European say, "Well, the Americans have potential protection for
better protection for shapes and trade dress. Now we also want to have the
three-dimensional mark protection, so you start to see a booming on shapes. Now,
on the other side, we have famous design expiring, famous copyrights expiring.”
When you start to look at these junctures as well, in my view, has created that.
The offices initially allow many more of these because distinctiveness is a very
ambiguous concept or is the same. Then they started to reign it in because they
saw there was no courts, the ECJ has been answering a bunch of these marks, that
the court in the US as well, even though I would say now courts are not as strict
as they were before because offices have been filtering more of these.
To me, it was allowed because the US didn't want industrial design
protection. I don't know if I'm right or wrong. This is something that Jerry
Reichman and I have been discussing at length because industrial design is a
cheaper right, but short, compared to forever trademarks.
DAVID STONE: I wonder, too, if another element of it is that a trademark
also has to function as an indication of source of origin, so you're already getting
a hurdle that you have to meet. The foldable chairs we saw earlier, I'm not an
expert in that field, but I'm not convinced that consumers would view the back of
the folding chair as an indication of where it came from, so it's not going to
function as a trademark in any event. With a registered design, it doesn't have to
function as anything. It is a right that you can enforce for up to 25 years, that you
don't even have to use yourself. There's not that additional hurdle of having to
function as an indication of source of origin that would already keep out a lot of
otherwise functional trademarks.
MARK A. LEMLEY: I think that's a great point. It was, literally, the last
point I wanted to note, which is that the vast majority of the functionality cases
that we see are, in fact, efforts by people to claim as trademarks things that are
very unlikely to be functioning as a trademark. No one looks at a dual spring on a
road sign and says, "Ah-ha, that must be a TrafFix and not a windproof dual
spring." I don't think anyone looks around a beach towel and says, "That must be
a CMI design beach towel."
Part of what the doctrine is effectively doing here, in many of these cases,
is policing overreaching. That does leave a sort of edge sort of cases where the
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design is actually very well recognized and understood. The Lego and the Kit Kat
cases are more challenging, conceptually, for that reason.
MARSHALL LEAFFER: I'd like to break in here right now. This has been
such a wonderful discussion. I hate to take the punch bowl away, but I think that
we have another session coming up. Everybody, thanks. Gordon, Irene, David,
and Jeff, thanks for the wonderful session.
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